Abstract. Twelve years ago, various notions of preferential entailment have been introduced. The main reference is a paper by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (KLM), one of the main competitor being a more general version defined by Makinson (MAK). These two versions have already been compared, but it is time to revisit these comparisons. Here are our main results: (1) These two notions are equivalent, provided that we restrict our attention, as done in KLM, to the cases where the entailment respects logical equivalence (on the left and on the right). (2) A serious simplification of the description of the fundamental cases in which MAK is equivalent to KLM, including a natural passage in both ways. (3) The two previous results are given for preferential entailments more general than considered in some texts, but they apply also to the original definitions and, for this particular case also, the models can be simplified.
INTRODUCTION
Here is one possible presentation of preferential entailments: We are given some knowledge, represented as a set of logical formulas. This set can be associated with various kinds of objects, providing its "semantics": it can be associated with its set of models, or equivalently in the propositional case, with the set of the complete theories which entail the formulas. Or it can be associated with the set of theories (complete or not) which entail the formulas. Then we are given a binary relation among these objects, and we keep only the objects which are "preferred" (meaning minimal) for this relation. We get a stronger set of formulas, deduced "by default": we get also all the formulas associated with this reduced set of objects. This allows to reason in a non monotonic way, since augmenting the knowledge may invalidate previous conclusions. Indeed, some objects may become minimal in the smaller set associated with the new knowledge. We can allow more flexibility by considering copies of models, or copies of theories, defining the relation among these sets of copies. We get then four kinds of preferential entailments, called KLM below, which have been introduced by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990) in [7] ( [7] requires some conditions on the relation, but adding these conditions is straightforward in our results).
Makinson (1994, first version in 1989) has defined a more general version [8] , called MAK here. An unstructured "semantics" is defined simply by a satisfaction relation from some set of objects to the set of formulas, without any condition. It is then useless to consider sets of these objects instead of singletons: its suffices to define directly as our starting set, the set of sets that we would want to consider. Also, since nothing prevents two different objects from being associated with the same set of formulas, it is useless to consider copies of objects. A drawback of this simple definition is that the notion of classical deduction is lost. The "entailment" can be highly non standard, departing from classical logic and natural ways of reasoning. We can e.g. deduce A ∧ B without deducing A. As a bonus, we can consider as our starting logic basically any non classical logic.
If we want to compare the two notions, we must determine which non standard behavior we admit in the "semantics" defining the preferential entailment. If we want to extend KLM entailment in order to deal with any situation accessible to MAK entailment, all we have to do is to admit any unconstrained satisfaction relation between the set of states and the set of formulas. We can even restrict our attention to the simplest of the four cases, defining the relation directly on the set of the objects describing the semantics. Thus, the interesting point is the other direction. Thanks to recent results on preferential entailments, we show that, provided classical equivalence is respected, MAK entailment is equivalent to KLM entailment. Since it is clear that KLM entailment respects logical equivalence, equivalence between the two formalisms holds in all the cases where it is possible. We describe a simple subclass of MAK models, which includes all the cases where MAK entailment respects classical equivalence, and for which it is easy to describe a passage from MAK formulation to KLM formulation and back. We improve previous results obtained by Dix and Makinson (1992) in [4] and by Voorbraak (1993) in [13] . The description of the subclass of MAK is much simpler than in [4] .
In Section 2 we introduce the notations and the logical prerequisite necessary for this text. In Section 3 we remind the definitions and main properties of the kind of preferential entailments considered here, giving our results in Section 4.
NOTATIONS AND FRAMEWORK
• L, ϕ, T : We work in a propositional language L, and we use the same denotation L for its set of formulas. Letters ϕ, ψ denote formulas (identified with their equivalence class). Letters T or C denote sets of formulas.
•
, denotes a set of propositional symbols and µ denotes an interpretation for L, identified with the subset of V (L) that it satisfies. The satisfaction relation is denoted by |=, µ |= ϕ and µ |= T being defined classically. For any set E, P(E) denotes the set of its subsets. The set P(V (L)) of the interpretations for L is denoted by M. A model of T is an interpretation µ such that µ |= T . The sets of the models of T and ϕ are denoted respectively by M(T ) and M(ϕ).
• T |= · · · , T h(T ), T: T |= ϕ and T |= T 1 are defined classically. A theory is a subset of L closed for deduction, and T denotes the set {T ⊆ L / T = T h(T )} of the theories of L.
The set T h(µ) = {ϕ ∈ L / µ |= ϕ} of the formulas satisfied by µ is the theory of µ. For any subset M1 of M, M1 |= T means µ |= T for any µ ∈ M1 and the theory of
. This ambiguous use of T h and of |= (applied to sets of formulas or interpretations) is usual. For any T ∈ T, we get
The set of all the complete theories is in a natural one-to-one mapping with M: For any µ ∈ M, T h(µ) is complete, and for any complete C ∈ T, M(C) is a singleton {µ} ⊆ M. For any T ⊆ L, we get µ |= T iff T h(µ) |= T and for any M1 ⊆ M, M1 |= T iff T h(M1) |= T .
PREFERENTIAL ENTAILMENTS

Preferential KLM entailment
Since their introduction [7] , these kinds of preferential entailment have been extensively studied. As [4] remarks, "the use of the term preferential is [..] rather anarchic [...]". The situation has not really improved since these "early years", however, it is clear that now the word is not restricted to the "cumulative cases" as done in [7] . The expression "preferential entailment" was first introduced by Shoham (1988) in [12] , and then regularly generalized and/or modified. The basic idea however is still the same: we consider a set of objects describing the semantics, and a binary relation ≺ on this set of objects. We get a "preferential semantics" in which only the objects, associated with a set of formulas, which are minimal for ≺, are considered. The definitions we give can be found in e.g. [7, Definitions 3.10, 3.13] ("single formula version") and [6, ("theory version", only version considered here), with some modifications which have already been considered in e.g. [4, 2, 5] . These modifications are either cosmetic, or consist in dropping some special condition imposed in the original text to the relation ≺, since (1) we do not need these restrictions, and (2) our study can accommodate in a straightforward way these restrictions. Definition 3.1 A KLM model is a triple S = (S, l, ≺), where S is a set, the elements of which are called states, l is a mapping S → P(M) that labels every state with a set of interpretations and ≺ is a binary relation on S, called a preference relation.
We define a satisfaction relation | ≡: for any s ∈ S, s| ≡ ϕ whenever l(s) |= ϕ and, for any T ⊆ L, s| ≡ T whenever l(s) |= T . For any set of formulas T ⊆ L, we define S(T ) = {s ∈ S / s|≡ T } and the set S≺(T ) of the states in S(T ) which are minimal for ≺ by S≺(T ) = {s ∈ S(T ) / s ≺ s for no s ∈ S(T )}.
S(T ) is T in the original texts. Notice that, as noted by in [1] , we can replace the set l(s) of interpretations by a theory, precisely the theory T h(l(s)), and we will in fact generally prefer this formulation, where l is a mapping S → T instead of S → P(M). Also, we drop here the consistency of states condition l(s) = ∅ (or alternatively l(s) = L if we consider labelling with theories) which appears in the original definitions. As explained below, this condition is unnecessary.
The role of l is to allow "copies of" sets of interpretations (or alternatively "copies" of theories), since various states can be mapped by l to the same object.
Definition 3.2 Let us call an entailment relation, any relation
From any entailment relation, we can define a mapping C from P(L) to itself, called an entailment:
ϕ and call the entailment CKLM a KLM preferential entailment, or a KLM entailment for short.
, assimilating a precircumscription to a particular extensive entailment. We write f (ϕ) for f ({ϕ}) = f (T h(ϕ)).
Thus, we call here pre-circumscription any entailment which respects full logical equivalence and which is extensive. By "respects full logical equivalence", we mean that, if T 1 and T 2 are two logically equivalent sets of formulas [i.e. T h(
The "right side" is equivalent to "right weakening": if
Definition 3.5 An entailment C satisfies (CT), cumulative transitivity, also known as "cut", if for any T ⊆ C(T ), we get C(T ∪ T ) ⊆ C(T ).
Here is a characterization of KLM entailments: Property 3.6 [7, 8] Any KLM entailment CKLM is a precircumscription satisfying (CT).
Property 3.7 [13, 9] Any pre-circumscription satisfying (CT) is a KLM entailment.
Particular KLM models can be considered. The three kinds described now originate also from [7] , where no special names are given. Let S = (S, l, ≺) be a KLM model. With the unrestricted case, we get then four kinds of models, which could give rise to four kinds of KLM entailments. We could without lack of generality restrict our attention to simplified KLM models: in the proof of Property 3.7, we can get a simplified KLM model ( [9] , this result could also be extracted from an independent work by Voorbraak [13] ). Thus, we do not really need "states" in KLM models. However, in the case of a singular KLM model, we generally cannot suppress the states if we want to keep only singletons in the image l(S) of l (as shown in a simple finite example in [7, p.193 ]): we cannot suppress the states without leaving this attractive particular case 2 . This feature is a good motivation for introducing states, but only in the case of singular models. Also we cannot express any KLM entailment thanks to a singular KLM model (a small finite counter-example in [7, proof of Lemma 4.5] applies here) 3 . This means that if we start from a preference relation defined on a set of copies of sets of interpretations (or equivalently of copies of theories), then we can find an equivalent relation defined directly on the set P(M) (or T), but we cannot always define the relation on the set M of interpretations or even on a set of copies of interpretations. Thus, we get three kinds of KLM preferential entailments (see their syntactical characterizations in [11] ), instead of four.
A consequence of this reduction to simplified models is that any singular model is equivalent to a simplified model (generally not singular), which is not obvious from the definitions.
Preferential MAK entailment
Makinson considers an entailment more general than its KLM counterpart, with a simpler definition. The price is that this notion leaves classical consequence altogether, getting a highly non standard preferential entailment in which we can conclude A ∧ B without concluding B, and in which what we conclude from A ∧ B is not related to what we conclude from {A, B}. This can be useful if we want to extend the notion of preferential entailment to non classical logics. However, if we want to stay in our good old classical way of reasoning, this is rather confusing. In any case, a fair comparison with KLM definitions needs to equate the ways we want to reason at first. This is what we will do in Section 4, after giving the definitions now. A MAK preferential entailment, or MAK entailment for short, is an entailment CMAK defined by a MAK entailment relation:
The names KLM model and MAK model are from [4] . What makes this short definition so powerful is that no condition is required for |≡. This makes the preferential entailment very different from what we expect for an "entailment". CMAK is far from being a pre-circumscription: if T 1 and T 2 are classically equivalent, we do not know anything about CMAK (T 2) when we know CMAK (T 1 ). Moreover, we almost need an extensive description of all the sets CMAK (T ), since they are not classical theories. If we drop the identification between a formula and its equivalence class, we can even consider logics where CMAK (A ∧ B) is different from CMAK (B ∧ A). However, we get interesting properties:
Property 3.10 [8] MAK entailments are extensive and satisfy (CT). This implies also idempotence: CMAK(CMAK (T )) = CMAK (T ).
The significance of (CT) for such kind of "entailment" is far from being as great as when we deal with pre-circumscriptions.
Before making a comparison between MAK and KLM, let us give a few natural definitions, which extend to (S, |≡) what is usually done with classical interpretations (M, |=).
Definitions 3.11 Let (S, |≡, ≺) be a MAK model. As in Definition 3.1, for s ∈ S, T ⊆ L, and ϕ ∈ L, S(T ) = {s ∈ S/s|≡ T } [and S(ϕ) = S({ϕ})]. We define the entailment Cn |≡ as follows:
Cn |≡ (T ) = {ϕ ∈ L/ for any s ∈ S(T ), s| ≡ ϕ}. We define also, for each s ∈ S: Cn |≡ (s) = {ϕ ∈ L / s| ≡ ϕ}.
We get (straightforward [4] ): Cn |≡ is a Tarski entailment, i.e. it is an extensive entailment satisfying idempotence (point 1) and monotony (point 2): for any sets T , T of formulas, 1. T ⊆ Cn |≡ (T ) = Cn |≡ (Cn |≡ (T )).
If T ⊆ T then Cn |≡ (T ) ⊆ Cn |≡ (T ).
Notice that we get: Cn |≡ (T ) = s∈S(T ) Cn |≡ (s). We use the same writing Cn |≡ for two different notions (cf T h in classical logic, Section 2): (a) an entailment defined by Cn |≡ (T ), and (b) a notion of "theory of a state" defined by Cn |≡ (s). A justification for this is that Cn |≡ (s) is indeed a theory in the meaning of Cn |≡ : for any s ∈ S, Cn |≡ (Cn |≡ (s)) = Cn |≡ (s).
Proof:
Here is another result [4]: For any T ⊆ L, Cn |≡ (T ) ⊆ CMAK (T ).
Notice that CMAK is not a Tarski entailment: it falsifies monotony.
RELATING MAK AND KLM ENTAILMENTS
The MAK entailments which are KLM ones
MAK notion encompasses KLM notion, as noticed in [8, 4]:
Property 4.1 For each KLM model S = (S, l, ≺) (defining a KLM entailment CKLM ), there exists a MAK model (S, |≡, ≺) such that its associated MAK entailment CMAK is equal to CKLM .
The states and the relation ≺ are unmodified, | ≡ is defined by: s| ≡ ϕ whenever l(s) |= ϕ [4] . We get then clearly | ∼
Here is a characterization of the subclass of MAK models which can be translated into KLM models.
Theorem 4.2 A MAK model S = (S, | ≡, ≺) gives rise to a MAK entailment CMAK which is equal to some KLM entailment CKLM iff the MAK entailment CMAK is a pre-circumscription.
Proof: The condition is necessary from Prop. 3.6. MAK entailments satisfy (CT) from Prop. 3.10, thus Prop. 3.7 gives the result. 2 Thus, what lacks to MAK entailment in order to be a KLM entailment is exactly the full preservation of logical equivalence.
This result is more a characterization of the subclass of the MAK entailments which can be turned into KLM entailments than a characterization of the subclass of MAK models which can be turned into KLM models. We will now get an easier and more direct property, which can be checked directly on the MAK model.
A subclass of MAK models which are KLM models
For any KLM entailment, we have T h(T ) ⊆ CKLM (T ). This has been taken into account in [4] for describing a subclass of the MAK models which (1) can be turned into KLM models and (2) is powerful enough to give all the KLM entailments. However, in [4] , the description of this subclass is needlessly complex. We will describe now a simpler and more general subclass satisfying (1) and (2).
Definitions 4.3 1. A MAK model S = (S, |≡, ≺)
is supra classical whenever we get T h(Cn |≡ (s)) = Cn |≡ (s) for any state s in S.
This means that the "world" associated to each state is classically deductively closed (i.e. is a classical theory). 2. An entailment C is supra classical if it satisfies T h(T ) ⊆ C(T ) for any T ⊆ L.
The first definition is independent of the preference relation ≺. Voorbraak [13] calls "L-faithful" our supra classical models.
For the second definition, notice that any pre-circumscription is a supra classical entailment.
Lemma 4.4 If a MAK model S = (S, | ≡, ≺) is such that the entailment
Cn |≡ is supra classical, then S is supra classical.
(2) T h(Cn |≡ (s)) ⊆ Cn |≡ (Cn |≡ (s)) by hypothesis, and we already know that we have in any case Cn |≡ (Cn |≡ (s)) = Cn |≡ (s), which establishes T h(Cn |≡ (s)) = Cn |≡ (s). 2
Lemma 4.5 If a MAK model S = (S, | ≡, ≺) is supra classical, then the (Tarski) entailment Cn |≡ and the (preferential) MAK entailment CMAK defined by S are pre-circumscriptions.
Proof: (1) Let ϕ ∈ T h(T ) and s ∈ S(T ), then ϕ ∈ Cn |≡ (s) by supra classicality of S. Thus, ϕ ∈ s∈S(T ) Cn |≡ (s) = Cn |≡ (T ): Cn |≡ is supra classical. From Cn |≡ (T ) = s∈S(T ) Cn |≡ (s) we get also Cn |≡ (T ) ∈ T since each Cn |≡ (s) is in T. Since by Definition 3.9 we get CMAK (T ) = s∈S≺(T ) Cn |≡ (s) (where the subset S≺(T ) of S(T ) is defined exactly as in Definition 3.1 for KLM models), we get a fortiori ϕ ∈ CMAK (T ) ∈ T.
(2) If T 1 and T 2 are two equivalent sets, then, by supra classicality of S, for each s ∈ S, we have s|≡ T 1 iff s|≡ T 2 , i.e. we have S(T 1 ) = S(T 2). A fortiori we get then S≺(T 1 ) = S≺(T 2 ). Thus we get Cn |≡ (T 1) = Cn |≡ (T 2 ) and CMAK(T 1) = CMAK (T 2) by the definitions of Cn |≡ (T ) and CMAK(T ) respectively. 2 We have established:
Property 4.6 1. A MAK model S = (S, | ≡, ≺) is supra classical iff the (Tarski) entailment
Cn |≡ that it defines is supra classical, iff the entailment Cn |≡ is a pre-circumscription.
If a MAK model is supra classical, then the (preferential) MAK entailment CMAK that it determines is a pre-circumscription.
We are now in position to establish our second main result: Proof: (1) Theorem 4.2 and Property 4.6-2 give the first sentence. Let S = (S, |≡, ≺) be a supra classical MAK model. We get a KLM model as follows: keeping S and ≺ unmodified, we define l as the mapping S → T by taking l(s) = Cn |≡ (s). It is immediate to see that the KLM entailment CKLM is equal to CMAK .
(2) We have a constructive proof already: It suffices to see the construction given in Property 4.1: it is clear from the definitions that the MAK model obtained there is supra classical since we have already noticed that each l(s) in Definition 3.1 can be equated to a classical theory. 2
Notice that the "cumulative" version of this theorem could also have been obtained from some results in an earlier independent work by Voorbraak [13] . Rather strangely, Voorbraak does not enounce these results, referring to [4] for further results on the subject.
Thus, we get characterization results and constructive passages simpler and easier than those given in [4] . However, our results are slightly more general (see why in note 5): the subclass of the MAK models considered here is slightly greater than the subclass considered by Dix and Makinson since they consider a strict subclass of the MAK models which can be "amplified" (in their terms). It is easy to see, from [4] together with our results, that the class of the MAK models which can be "amplified" coincide with the class of the supra classical MAK models. Moreover, our comparison does not need to consider a third intermediate (between Cn |≡ and CMAK ) non classical entailment 4 , which plays an important role in the results of [4] , but which complicates the direct comparison between KLM and MAK preferential entailments. This simplification comes mainly from our results about supra classical MAK models. And the condition that each Cn |≡ (s) must be a theory is easily checked, without the need to compute the associated MAK entailment or to introduce a third non classical entailment.
If we are concerned only by those MAK entailments which respect full logical equivalence, we can restrict our attention to a yet narrower class of MAK models. Indeed, we have seen why in this case we can restrict our attention to the easily described class of supra classical MAK models. Now, since we can consider only the simplified version of KLM models, our passages between MAK models and KLM models show that we can also require a unicity of states condition for MAK models. By "unicity of states", we mean that, for any different s, s ∈ S, the "worlds" Cn |≡ (s) and Cn |≡ (s ) corresponding to these two states are different. The class of the supra classical MAK models satisfying unicity of states is powerful enough to generate all the MAK entailments which are pre-circumscriptions. Let us describe now the analogous of the singular and the strictly singular KLM models in terms of MAK models. 
Conversely, let us suppose (R∧). Then, if {ϕi}∈I ⊆ Cn |≡ (s) and {ϕi}i∈I |= ϕ, by compactness of |= there exists a finite J ⊆ I such that {ϕi}i∈J |= ϕ, i.e. i∈J ϕi |= ϕ, i.e. i∈J ϕi ≡ ( i∈J ϕi) ∧ ϕ, thus, by (R∧), ϕ ∈ Cn |≡ (s). Remind that we identify a formula with its equivalence class. Makinson does not always make this assumption in [8] , thus, his original formalism is slightly more general than the version given in the present text. However, since with KLM entailments a formula can always be replaced by an equivalent formula, we must make this assumption when we want to compare the two formalisms: If this assumption is not made till the beginning (as in this text), then it must be added, e.g. by requiring in Definition 4.3-1 that |= is standard. Notice that Definition 4.3-1 as it stands implies that two formulas equivalent (for |=) are always in the same sets Cn |≡ (s), thus are "equivalent for | ≡".
A MAK model is classical iff | ≡ respects all the logical connectors. For instance, it is immediate to see that (R∧) and (R¬) imply (R∨):
Classical MAK models correspond to singular KLM models while the classical MAK models which respect unicity of states correspond to the strictly singular KLM models.
Coming back to the original KLM entailments
This work applies also to cases where special conditions are required for the models. We think that the simplicity and the naturalness of our translation is a first serious indication for this. Let us consider the original definitions. [7] considers only the KLM models which are consistent and smooth. The authors consider that cumulative monotony
is as important as (CT), and they only care of cumulative entailments, which satisfy (CT) and (CM). They give the following characterization [7, Theorem 3 .25]:
A pre-circumscription C is cumulative iff it is a KLM entailment defined by a smooth and consistent KLM model. This characterization result also holds without the consistency condition, which confirms our opinion that, for KLM entailments, the requirement that l(s) must be consistent is needless 5 . We get, with the KLM models as defined here, a first modification of KLM characterization (the proof is an easy modification of the proof of the original characterization [7] , moreover this result has already appeared as [8 A pre-circumscription C is cumulative iff it is a KLM entailment defined by a smooth KLM model.
We can go even further, by requiring that the KLM model is a simplified KLM model (see the companion paper published under the same tittle as the present paper in the Workshop NMR 2002, § 4.3).
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
We have shown that the notions of preferential entailment as defined by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor and as defined by Makinson are much closely related than was supposed before. Indeed, these two notions coincide exactly in all the cases where they can coincide, that is when the underlying logic respects classical equivalence. Moreover, we have shown that a similar result holds also for the respective models defining the two notions. It was already known that any KLM model could easily be turned into a MAK model. We have exhibited a natural subclass of the MAK models which can, exactly as easily, be turned into a KLM model. The subclass obtained here is slightly greater, and is much easier to describe, than what was previously known. And this subclass of models is "complete": it generates all the KLM preferential entailments. This subclass is the class of the MAK models for which all the states have a "classical" behavior: the set of formulas they satisfy is closed for classical deduction. This subclass is the most natural class to consider. Indeed, this is the class such that, for any preference relation ≺, we are certain from the beginning that the MAK preferential entailment generated has a classical behavior with respect to logical equivalence. Some MAK models outside this class can give rise to a KLM entailment, but these models can easily be turned into classically behaved ones.
Our results apply to important particular subclasses of KLM models: (1) the models which are simplified in that the labelling mapping l is needless, (2) the "smooth"models (corresponding to cumulative preferential entailments).
As (non trivial) future work, let us remark that these results should help further study on the subject, since they show that this kind of preferential entailment is not as "cumbersome" as it is qualified even in the founding paper [7] . Even automatic computation could take advantage from these results, since the models considered here have nice properties, which, hopefully, could help designing new kinds of "preferential entailments demonstrators".
